AP Comparative Government Unit 2 practice questions
Try 10 multiple-choice questions from Unit 2 here. Pick an answer to see why it's right or wrong, then take the timed test above for a full AP-style set.
Question 1
Source:Samuel Oni, "Governance and Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Government Level of Nigeria´s Presidential System," Covenant University Repository (Covenant University), 2014.
Several decades after political independence, Nigeria is still faced with the problem of the right model of governance that will achieve its noble objectives. Following the collapse of the First Republic, Nigeria jettisoned the Westminster parliamentary system and adopted the presidential system. Neither has the parliamentary nor the presidential model of governance been able to guarantee the political stability that is much needed for development and the relationship between the executive and legislature being the single most problematic issue. With heavy reliance on empirical and secondary data, this paper examines the nature of legislature-executive relations at the state level of Nigeria’s presidential system and found that these two political institutions have been relating with each other under an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, acrimony and political rivalry orchestrated largely by local godfathers in alliance with the presidency. It therefore argues that, while legislative-executive conflict may be inevitable in the presidential democratic government, mechanism for harmonious relationship between the legislature and executive is imperative for good governance in Nigeria.
Based on the passage, which of the following best explains why adopting the presidential system failed to resolve Nigeria's governance challenges, even though it was intended as an improvement over the parliamentary model?
Informal power networks of local godfathers operating in alliance with the presidency undermine the formal institutional checks that the presidential system was designed to provide.
The presidential system concentrates executive authority in ways that structurally prevent the legislature from exercising meaningful oversight over government policy.
Nigeria's transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system was too rapid to allow political elites to develop the norms of institutional cooperation required for stable governance.
Presidential systems inherently produce legislative-executive conflict because the separate electoral mandates of each branch create competing claims to democratic legitimacy.
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Answer: (A)
The passage's argument hinges on a distinction between formal institutional design and informal political dynamics. While the presidential system was adopted to improve governance after the First Republic's collapse, the passage identifies 'local godfathers in alliance with the presidency' as the key driver of legislature-executive dysfunction. The correct answer captures this informal-formal gap. Distractor B misreads the relationship as one of executive dominance rather than mutual conflict. Distractor C introduces a transitional pace argument absent from the text. Distractor D correctly notes that presidential systems can produce inherent conflict but misses the passage's specific causal emphasis on informal power networks.
Question 2
Using Freedom House data, what implication about UK and Chinese judicial independence would a political scientist draw?
UK courts can check the executive while Chinese courts face party-state constraints
Differences in judges' intelligence explain differing judicial independence across countries
Court systems are identical and observed differences reflect cultural preferences
Chinese courts are more efficient because limited independence reduces trial delays
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Answer: (A)
Freedom House ratings measure judicial autonomy and capacity to check the executive. They show UK courts exercise horizontal accountability while Chinese courts operate under party-state constraints.
Question 3
A political scientist studying the United Kingdom writes: 'Parliamentary sovereignty means the House of Commons can theoretically pass any legislation without judicial review, yet in practice, constitutional conventions, judicial precedent, and European Union membership historically constrained legislative power.' What is the author's main claim about British parliamentary authority?
Formal legal authority differs significantly from practical institutional constraints on power
The House of Commons has never exercised its theoretical power to pass unrestricted legislation
Constitutional conventions are more important than parliamentary legislation in British governance
European Union membership eliminated parliamentary sovereignty entirely
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Answer: (A)
The author's central claim distinguishes between theoretical parliamentary sovereignty and actual limitations imposed by conventions, precedent, and external commitments. This demonstrates how political scientists analyze the gap between formal rules and real constraints.
Question 4
A comparative politics discussion contrasts the UK's majority rule and party discipline in Parliament with Mexico's supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments. Which best describes the type of evidence used to illustrate institutional differences between the two countries?
Procedural rules showing different decision-making mechanisms in each country's legislature
Counts of laws passed comparing legislative output across the two countries
Survey or public opinion measures of citizen satisfaction with each legislature
Biographical profiles and backgrounds of individual legislators rather than institutional procedures
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Answer: (A)
The discussion relies on concrete procedural rules: UK majority rule versus Mexico's supermajority requirement. Those rules directly illustrate institutional differences in decision making.
Question 5
An author argues that a Prime Minister's power depends on maintaining a House of Commons majority, so loss of confidence can remove them, unlike presidents with fixed terms. The author supports this claim by contrasting how the executive is held accountable in parliamentary systems with how it is held accountable in presidential systems, pointing to confidence votes in one and fixed terms in the other. The author cites no specific historical cases, public opinion data, or statistics. Which best describes the evidence the author uses to support this claim?
Comparison of executive accountability in parliamentary versus presidential systems
Historical examples of Prime Ministers removed by parliamentary confidence votes
Public opinion showing British voters prefer parliamentary over presidential systems
Statistical comparison of removal rates for Prime Ministers and presidents
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Answer: (A)
The author compares institutional accountability mechanisms, highlighting confidence votes in parliament versus fixed presidential terms. This structural comparison directly supports the claim about where executive authority derives.
Question 6
A political scientist notes near-unanimous National People's Congress votes reflect decisions set within the Communist Party before formal voting. Which feature of China's political system does this most directly illustrate?
Party control of state institutions that centralizes decision making before votes
Central Military Commission's role in directing national defense strategy
Local people's mediation committees resolving grassroots disputes and complaints
Greater transparency in provincial budgets and public fiscal reporting
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Answer: (A)
The Communist Party dominates state institutions, so key decisions are made inside the party before formal legislative votes. Near-unanimous NPC votes reflect this centralized pre-vote decision making.
Question 7
Electoral data show women make up 22% of Russia's parliament and 34% of the United Kingdom's parliament. What constraint most limits drawing conclusions about gender equality from this comparison?
Seat percentages show formal access but not women's actual decision-making power.
Different absolute parliament sizes do not invalidate percentage comparisons.
Different electoral systems affect seat shares but do not measure substantive power.
Cultural differences may explain patterns but do not limit measurement validity.
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Answer: (A)
Seat shares reflect formal representation but not actual decision-making power. Women may face exclusion from key committees and lack influence over policy, so percentages can misrepresent substantive gender equality.
Question 8
Unlike the UK's parliamentary system where the House of Commons can remove the chief executive through a vote of no confidence, China's National People's Congress cannot effectively challenge the Communist Party leadership. This institutional difference implies that China's system provides
weaker horizontal accountability mechanisms for executive power
greater protection for individual civil liberties through judicial review
more efficient policy implementation due to unified party-state control
stronger legitimacy because citizens prefer decisive executive action
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Answer: (A)
Recognizing that parliamentary systems create formal mechanisms for legislative oversight of executives while single-party systems concentrate power in party structures reveals how institutional design affects accountability. The absence of meaningful legislative checks on executive authority in China demonstrates reduced horizontal accountability compared to systems with separation of powers.
Question 9
A researcher compares judicial review in six countries using court decisions, constitutions, and Freedom House rule of law scores. Which inference best shows how combining these sources enables comparative analysis single sources cannot support?
Texts, rulings, and rule-of-law scores show gaps in judicial independence
Formal authority alone determines identical judicial review across countries
Using decision frequency cannot establish causation between constitutions and independence
Freedom House rule of law ratings alone cannot show whether constitutional powers are enforced
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Answer: (A)
Multiple sources show whether formal powers translate into real judicial independence. Texts record formal authority, rulings show behavior, and rule-of-law scores supply institutional context so gaps become visible.
Question 10
Both the UK and Mexico have formal merit-based recruitment, yet their civil services function differently. Which combination of data best supports that conclusion?
Corruption indices combined with recruitment records and hiring audits
Comparative civil service salary levels and benefit packages across countries
Sole reliance on Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings
Historical adoption dates and origins of merit systems without enforcement data
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Answer: (A)
Corruption indices and recruitment records plus hiring audits show whether merit rules guide actual hiring. These sources reveal enforcement, patronage patterns, and align with MPA-1.A.8 and AP Comp Gov 1.C.
What's on the AP Comparative Government Unit 2 practice test
The standard version takes about 67 minutes and follows the timing and directions of the AP exam, sized to one unit:
- 20 Multiple Choice Questions (22 minutes)
- 1 FRQ – FRQ 1 – Conceptual Analysis (23 minutes)
- 1 FRQ – FRQ 2 – Quantitative Analysis (23 minutes)
Questions are drawn from 1838 multiple-choice questions and 79 FRQs written for Unit 2, Political Institutions.
Practice AP Comparative Government Unit 2 FRQs
Answer the unit's free-response questions one at a time and get a score on every part.
- FRQ 1 – Conceptual Analysis (22 questions)
- FRQ 2 – Quantitative Analysis (23 questions)
- FRQ 3 – Comparative Analysis (19 questions)
- FRQ 4 – Argument Essay (15 questions)
Review Unit 2 before you start
- 2.1 Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Systems
- 2.2 Comparing Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Systems
- 2.3 Executive Systems
- 2.4 Executive Term Limits
- 2.5 Removal of Executives
- 2.6 Legislative Systems
- 2.7 Independent Legislatures
- 2.8 Judicial Systems
- 2.9 Independent Judiciaries