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Thought experiments are philosophy's laboratory—they strip away real-world noise to isolate the core principles being tested. When you encounter these scenarios on an exam, you're not just being asked to summarize a hypothetical situation. You're being tested on your ability to identify the underlying philosophical problem, connect it to major schools of thought (epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics), and explain why the experiment succeeds or fails at challenging a particular position.
These ten thought experiments recur throughout philosophical texts because they expose tensions that centuries of thinkers haven't fully resolved. The Trolley Problem isn't just about trains—it's a battlefield for consequentialism versus deontology. Plato's Cave isn't just an allegory—it's the foundation of rationalist epistemology. Don't just memorize the scenarios; know what philosophical position each experiment attacks, defends, or complicates. That's what earns full credit on FRQs.
These experiments challenge our most basic assumptions about knowledge: Can we trust our senses? Is there a gap between what we perceive and what's real? What counts as genuine knowledge?
Compare: The Evil Demon vs. Brain in a Vat—both challenge sensory reliability, but the Evil Demon targets all knowledge while Brain in a Vat specifically questions whether physical science can prove its own foundations. If an FRQ asks about skepticism's limits, Putnam's semantic response to the vat scenario is your strongest counterargument.
These experiments probe the hard problem of consciousness: What is subjective experience, and can physical explanations fully account for it?
Compare: Mary's Room vs. Philosophical Zombie—both attack physicalism, but Mary's Room argues we have non-physical knowledge, while the Zombie argument claims consciousness itself is non-physical. Mary's Room is epistemological; the Zombie is metaphysical. Use Mary for knowledge questions, Zombies for consciousness questions.
These scenarios force us to confront competing moral frameworks: Do consequences determine right action, or do principles? What makes a society just?
Compare: The Trolley Problem vs. The Experience Machine—both test utilitarian assumptions, but Trolley challenges whether maximizing welfare justifies any action, while Experience Machine challenges whether welfare is just pleasure. Together, they expose utilitarianism's vulnerabilities from two directions.
These experiments ask what makes something the same thing over time—and whether our intuitions about identity are coherent.
Compare: Ship of Theseus vs. Philosophical Zombie—both concern identity, but Ship of Theseus asks about persistence through change (metaphysics of objects), while the Zombie asks about what constitutes a mind (metaphysics of consciousness). Ship is about numerical identity; Zombie is about qualitative identity of mental states.
| Concept | Best Examples |
|---|---|
| Skepticism about external world | Evil Demon, Brain in a Vat |
| Limits of physicalism | Mary's Room, Philosophical Zombie, Chinese Room |
| Consequentialism vs. deontology | Trolley Problem, Experience Machine |
| Social contract theory | Veil of Ignorance |
| Personal/object identity | Ship of Theseus |
| Appearance vs. reality | Plato's Cave, Brain in a Vat |
| Philosophy of AI | Chinese Room |
| Nature of knowledge | Mary's Room, Plato's Cave |
Both Mary's Room and the Philosophical Zombie challenge physicalism—what is the key difference in how they challenge it, and which would you use to argue against reductive materialism versus eliminative materialism?
Identify two thought experiments that could be used to critique utilitarianism. What specific aspect of utilitarian theory does each one target?
How does Putnam's semantic externalism attempt to defuse the Brain in a Vat scenario, and why doesn't this same response work against Descartes' Evil Demon?
Compare the Ship of Theseus with debates about personal identity over time. If you accept that the Ship remains "the same" despite total replacement, what does this commit you to regarding human identity?
An FRQ asks you to evaluate whether artificial intelligence could ever achieve genuine understanding. Which thought experiment provides the strongest argument against this possibility, and what is the central distinction it draws?