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Healthcare payment systems aren't just administrative details—they're the economic engines that drive provider behavior, patient access, and the overall efficiency of healthcare delivery. When you're being tested on healthcare financing, you need to understand that every payment model creates specific incentives that shape how care is delivered. The fundamental tension in healthcare economics is balancing cost control, quality of care, and access—and each payment system prioritizes these differently.
Don't just memorize what each system pays; know why it was designed that way and what behaviors it encourages or discourages. Exam questions will ask you to analyze trade-offs, predict provider responses to incentive structures, and compare systems that seem similar but produce very different outcomes. Master the underlying economic logic, and you'll be able to tackle any scenario they throw at you.
These traditional models reimburse providers based on the quantity of services delivered. The more you do, the more you get paid—which creates powerful incentives that can work for or against patients.
Compare: Fee-for-Service vs. Prospective Payment—both pay for services rendered, but FFS reimburses actual costs while PPS sets fixed rates in advance. This timing difference fundamentally changes provider incentives: FFS rewards doing more, PPS rewards doing it cheaper.
These systems bundle payments around specific conditions or treatments, encouraging providers to think about the complete care pathway rather than individual services.
Compare: DRGs vs. Bundled Payments—both use fixed payments for defined care episodes, but DRGs apply to hospital stays only while bundles can span the entire care continuum (surgery, rehab, follow-up). FRQs often ask which model better addresses care fragmentation—bundled payments is your answer.
These models pay providers a fixed amount to care for a defined population, shifting focus from treating illness to maintaining health.
Compare: Capitation vs. ACOs—both involve population-based payment, but capitation pays individual providers a fixed amount while ACOs create shared accountability across provider networks. ACOs add quality metrics that pure capitation lacks, addressing the underutilization concern.
These systems tie reimbursement to measurable performance outcomes, attempting to reward value rather than volume.
Compare: P4P vs. VBP—these terms are often used interchangeably, but P4P typically refers to bonus payments added to base reimbursement while VBP adjusts the base payment itself. Both reward quality, but VBP carries more financial stakes. If an FRQ asks about Medicare quality initiatives, VBP is the more specific answer.
These systems reflect how Medicare and Medicaid structure provider reimbursement, often serving as testing grounds for payment innovation.
Compare: Medicare vs. Medicaid payment approaches—Medicare sets national standards with consistent payment rules, while Medicaid allows state-level variation in reimbursement models. This distinction matters for questions about federalism in healthcare policy.
| Concept | Best Examples |
|---|---|
| Volume incentives | Fee-for-Service |
| Fixed prospective rates | PPS, DRGs, Capitation |
| Episode-based payment | DRGs, Bundled Payments |
| Population health focus | Capitation, Global Budgeting, ACOs |
| Quality-linked payment | P4P, Value-Based Purchasing |
| Risk transfer to providers | Capitation, DRGs, Bundled Payments |
| Care coordination incentives | Bundled Payments, ACOs |
| Government program innovation | Medicare VBP, Medicaid Managed Care |
Which two payment models both use fixed prospective payments but differ in whether they apply to individual services or entire care episodes? What behavioral incentives does each create?
A hospital administrator wants to reduce average length of stay. Which payment system creates the strongest financial incentive for this goal, and why might FFS work against it?
Compare capitation and ACOs: What problem with pure capitation do ACOs attempt to solve, and what mechanism do they use to address it?
If an FRQ asks you to recommend a payment model that reduces care fragmentation for patients with chronic conditions requiring multiple specialists, which model would you choose and what evidence would you cite?
How do value-based purchasing and fee-for-service represent opposite approaches to the volume-versus-value debate in healthcare economics? What trade-offs does each model accept?