Landmark Defamation Cases

Why This Matters

Defamation law sits at the crossroads of two competing constitutional values: First Amendment press freedom and the protection of individual reputation. Every case on this list shaped how courts balance these tensions, and you're being tested on your ability to trace that evolution. The Supreme Court didn't hand journalists unlimited protection—it created a tiered system based on who is being discussed, what standard of fault applies, and who bears the burden of proof.

Don't just memorize case names and dates. Know what legal principle each case established and how it changed the landscape for journalists. When an FRQ asks about defamation standards, you need to identify which case applies to a given scenario—a public official requires different analysis than a private businessperson. Understanding the actual malice standard, the public figure doctrine, and the opinion versus fact distinction will carry you through most exam questions on this topic.

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Establishing the Foundation: The Actual Malice Standard

These cases created the core framework that protects press criticism of those in power. Actual malice requires proof that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth—a deliberately high bar designed to prevent self-censorship.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964)

• Established the "actual malice" standard—public officials must prove the publisher knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for truth
• Revolutionized First Amendment press protections by recognizing that some false statements are inevitable in free debate and must be tolerated
• Set the baseline for all subsequent defamation law, making this the single most important case to know for any journalism law exam

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967)

• Extended actual malice to public figures, not just government officials—recognizing that celebrities, athletes, and other prominent individuals have similar access to media platforms
• Required media to exercise high care when reporting on public figures, though still protecting good-faith errors
• Broadened Sullivan's reach beyond politics to sports, entertainment, and other arenas of public interest

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Defining Who Qualifies: The Public Figure Doctrine

Not everyone who appears in the news becomes a public figure. These cases establish the criteria courts use to determine plaintiff status—and therefore which standard of fault applies.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974)

• Distinguished private individuals from public figures—private plaintiffs need only prove negligence, not actual malice, to recover damages
• Recognized that private individuals deserve greater protection because they lack the media access to counter false statements
• Allowed states to set their own fault standards for private-figure cases, creating variation in defamation law across jurisdictions

Time, Inc. v. Firestone (1976)

• Clarified that involvement in newsworthy events doesn't automatically create public figure status—a socialite's divorce, though covered extensively, didn't make her a public figure
• Established the "voluntary entry" test—public figures must have thrust themselves into public controversy, not merely been drawn into news coverage
• Narrowed the public figure category, providing more plaintiffs access to the easier negligence standard

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (1971)

• Proposed applying actual malice based on subject matter, not plaintiff status—if the topic was of public concern, the higher standard would apply
• Represented a short-lived expansion of press protection that was later limited by Gertz
• Highlighted the ongoing tension between protecting speech on public issues and protecting private individuals caught up in them

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Protecting Opinion and Satire

The First Amendment doesn't just protect factual reporting—it shields commentary, parody, and rhetorical statements. But the line between protected opinion and actionable false fact remains contested.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988)

• Protected parody and satire even when deeply offensive—a crude fake advertisement about Jerry Falwell couldn't support an emotional distress claim
• Required public figures to prove actual malice for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, preventing end-runs around defamation standards
• Affirmed that offensiveness alone doesn't strip speech of protection—the First Amendment guards unpopular expression

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990)

• Rejected a blanket "opinion privilege"—statements framed as opinion can still be actionable if they imply provably false facts
• Established the "provable as false" test—only statements that can be objectively verified are potentially defamatory
• Closed a loophole that had allowed defendants to escape liability simply by labeling accusations as "opinion"

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Burden of Proof and Private Context

These cases address procedural questions that significantly affect outcomes: who must prove what, and does the public interest in the speech matter?

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986)

• Shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs in cases involving matters of public concern—they must prove the statement was false
• Departed from common law tradition where defendants bore the burden of proving truth
• Strengthened press protection by recognizing that requiring defendants to prove truth would chill speech on public issues

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985)

• Limited First Amendment protection for purely private speech—a credit report about a private company didn't warrant the same safeguards as public discourse
• Allowed presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice when speech involves purely private matters
• Created a two-track system where constitutional protections depend partly on whether the speech addresses public concerns

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Journalistic Standards and Accuracy

These cases directly address reporting practices and the consequences of getting facts wrong or altering sources.

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991)

• Held that deliberate alteration of quotes can constitute actual malice if the changes materially alter the speaker's meaning
• Rejected the argument that quotation marks guarantee accuracy—journalists can't hide behind formatting to misrepresent sources
• Reinforced fidelity to sources as both an ethical and legal obligation, with real consequences for fabrication

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Quick Reference Table

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Self-Check Questions

1. Which two cases both require actual malice but apply to different categories of plaintiffs, and what distinguishes those categories?

2. A newspaper publishes a harsh editorial calling a local restaurant owner "a crook who poisons customers." The owner sues. What standard of fault applies, and which case establishes the rule for determining the owner's status?

3. Compare Hustler v. Falwell and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal: both involve non-factual speech, so why did the outcomes differ?

4. If an FRQ asks you to explain why the plaintiff—not the defendant—must prove falsity in a defamation case involving a public issue, which case provides your answer, and what was the Court's reasoning?

5. A journalist substantially rewrites a source's quotes to make them more dramatic while keeping the general topic the same. Under Masson, what must a plaintiff prove to establish actual malice based on this conduct?