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Healthcare payment models aren't just administrative details—they fundamentally shape how medicine is practiced in the United States. The way providers get paid influences everything from how long your doctor spends with you to whether hospitals prioritize keeping you healthy or simply treating you when you're sick. You're being tested on understanding how financial incentives drive clinical behavior, and why policymakers keep experimenting with new payment structures to balance cost control, quality improvement, and access to care.
These models represent the healthcare system's ongoing struggle to solve a core tension: traditional payment rewards doing more, while better health often means doing less (but doing it smarter). Don't just memorize what each model pays—know what behavior it incentivizes, what risks it creates, and how it compares to alternatives. When you see an exam question about healthcare reform or cost containment, payment models are almost always part of the answer.
These traditional models pay providers based on the quantity of services delivered. The more you do, the more you earn—which creates powerful incentives that don't always align with patient health.
Compare: Fee-for-Service vs. DRGs—both are volume-based, but FFS rewards more services while DRGs reward fewer services per admission. If an exam asks about hospital cost containment, DRGs are your go-to example of how fixed payments changed inpatient behavior.
These models pay providers a set amount to care for a defined group of patients. The financial risk shifts from payers to providers, who must manage care within fixed budgets.
Compare: Capitation vs. Global Budgets—both involve fixed payments, but capitation is per-patient while global budgets cover entire populations or systems. Global budgets give providers more flexibility but require more advanced management infrastructure.
These models tie reimbursement to quality outcomes rather than just volume or population size. Providers earn more by demonstrating better results, not just delivering more care.
Compare: P4P vs. VBP—both reward quality, but P4P typically adds bonuses while VBP adjusts base rates (meaning poor performers actually lose money). VBP creates stronger incentives because the downside risk is real.
These models pay a single amount for all services related to a specific condition or procedure. Providers must coordinate across settings to deliver care within the bundled payment.
Compare: Bundled Payments vs. DRGs—both involve fixed payments, but DRGs cover only the hospital stay while bundles include pre-admission and post-discharge care. Bundles create stronger incentives for care coordination across settings.
These organizational structures combine payment reform with delivery system redesign. They create new entities responsible for managing care across the continuum.
Compare: ACOs vs. PCMHs—ACOs focus on total cost accountability across all providers, while PCMHs focus on primary care transformation. Many ACOs include PCMHs as their foundation, but PCMHs can exist independently without shared savings arrangements.
| Concept | Best Examples |
|---|---|
| Volume incentives | Fee-for-Service, DRGs |
| Population-based risk | Capitation, Global Budgets |
| Quality incentives | Pay-for-Performance, Value-Based Purchasing |
| Episode-based payment | Bundled Payments |
| Shared savings | ACOs, Shared Savings Programs |
| Care coordination structures | ACOs, PCMHs |
| Provider risk assumption | Capitation, Global Budgets, Bundled Payments |
| Patient choice maximized | Fee-for-Service |
Which two payment models both involve fixed payments but differ in whether the unit is per-patient or per-episode? What behavioral incentives does each create?
A hospital administrator wants to reduce average length of stay. Which payment model most directly incentivizes this goal, and what unintended consequence might result?
Compare and contrast Pay-for-Performance and Value-Based Purchasing. Why might VBP create stronger incentives for quality improvement?
An FRQ asks you to explain how payment reform could reduce healthcare spending while improving outcomes. Which two models would you choose as examples, and what mechanisms would you emphasize?
A primary care practice joins an ACO and also achieves PCMH recognition. How do these two models complement each other, and what payment streams might the practice now receive?