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Game theory is the analytical backbone of oligopoly analysis—and oligopoly questions appear consistently on the AP Microeconomics exam. When firms recognize that their pricing and output decisions affect competitors (and vice versa), simple supply-and-demand analysis breaks down. You need game theory to explain why firms might collude, why cartels tend to collapse, and why oligopolies often produce outcomes somewhere between perfect competition and monopoly. The concepts here—dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, payoff matrices, and the prisoner's dilemma—give you the tools to analyze any strategic interaction the exam throws at you.
The College Board specifically tests your ability to read payoff matrices, identify dominant strategies, find Nash equilibria, and calculate the incentive needed to change a player's behavior. These skills show up in both multiple-choice questions and FRQs, often in the context of two firms deciding whether to advertise, set high or low prices, or cheat on a collusive agreement. Don't just memorize definitions—know how to apply each concept to a payoff matrix and explain why rational players end up where they do.
Understanding equilibrium in games means identifying stable outcomes where no player wants to change their behavior. An equilibrium occurs when each player's strategy is a best response to what others are doing.
Compare: Dominant Strategy Equilibrium vs. Nash Equilibrium—both represent stable outcomes, but dominant strategy equilibrium is a special case where each player has a dominant strategy. A Nash equilibrium can exist even when no dominant strategies are present. If an FRQ asks you to "find the equilibrium," always check for dominant strategies first, then verify it's a Nash equilibrium.
The prisoner's dilemma explains why cartels collapse and why oligopolists struggle to maintain high prices. Individual rationality leads to collectively suboptimal outcomes when players can't make binding agreements.
Compare: Prisoner's Dilemma vs. Cartel Behavior—the prisoner's dilemma structure explains why cartels like OPEC struggle to maintain output quotas. Each member benefits from cheating while others cooperate, but when everyone cheats, prices fall and all members suffer. This is your go-to example for explaining collusion instability on FRQs.
Whether players move simultaneously or sequentially fundamentally changes how you analyze strategic interactions. The timing of moves determines what information players have when making decisions.
Compare: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Games—simultaneous games use payoff matrices while sequential games use game trees. The Stackelberg model (leader-follower oligopoly) is sequential; standard prisoner's dilemma problems are simultaneous. Know which tool to apply based on whether the problem specifies that one firm "moves first."
When games are played multiple times, players can reward cooperation and punish defection, fundamentally changing equilibrium outcomes. The shadow of future interactions can sustain cooperation that would collapse in one-shot games.
Compare: One-Shot vs. Repeated Games—in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, defection is the dominant strategy. In a repeated game with uncertain ending, cooperation can be sustained through strategies like tit-for-tat. If an FRQ asks why firms might maintain collusive prices despite incentives to cheat, repeated interaction is your answer.
| Concept | Best Examples |
|---|---|
| Dominant Strategy | Prisoner's dilemma defection, firm's decision to advertise when it always increases profit |
| Nash Equilibrium | Both firms defecting, both firms advertising, any stable payoff matrix outcome |
| Collusion Instability | Cartels breaking down, OPEC members exceeding quotas, price-fixing agreements failing |
| Simultaneous Game Analysis | Payoff matrices, duopoly pricing decisions, advertising games |
| Sequential Game Analysis | Stackelberg model, entry deterrence, game trees with backward induction |
| Cooperation in Repeated Games | Tit-for-tat, trigger strategies, long-term supplier relationships |
| Mixed Strategies | Randomizing prices, unpredictable competitive behavior |
| Incentive to Cheat | Calculating payoff difference between defecting and cooperating |
Given a 2x2 payoff matrix, how do you systematically identify whether each player has a dominant strategy, and what do you conclude if only one player has one?
In a prisoner's dilemma, both players end up at the Nash equilibrium despite a better collective outcome existing. Explain why this happens and connect it to cartel instability in oligopoly markets.
Compare simultaneous and sequential games: which analytical tool (payoff matrix or game tree) applies to each, and how does the Stackelberg model differ from a standard Cournot duopoly in this regard?
A firm is considering cheating on a collusive agreement. The collusive payoff is per period forever, the cheating payoff is in the first period followed by forever after (due to retaliation). Under what conditions would the firm maintain cooperation?
Why might tit-for-tat sustain cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma when defection is the dominant strategy in the one-shot version? What features of the strategy make it effective?